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Abstract
In this experimental study, involving subjects from Abu-Dis (West Bank), Chengdu (China),
Helsinki (Finland), and Jerusalem (Israel), we test for a presentation bias in a two-person coop-
eration game. In the positive frame of the game, a transfer creates a positive externality for the
opposite player, and in the negative frame, a negative one. Subjects in Abu-Dis and Chengdu
show a substantially higher cooperation level in the positive externality treatment. In Helsinki
and Jerusalem, no framing eect is observed. These ndings are also reected in associated
rst-order beliefs. We argue that comparisons across subject-pools might lead to only partially
meaningful and opposed conclusions if only one treatment condition is evaluated. We therefore
suggest a complementary application and consideration of dierent presentations of identical
decision problems within (cross-cultural) research on subject-pool dierences.
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A vast body of literature demonstrates that dierent presentations of the same decision task
can induce a so-called framing eect: behavior changes, although the underlying information
and decisions remain essentially the same. Early investigations of pure framing eects have
shown that variations in the form of presentation - of cooperation problems as a whole or
of specic variables - manipulate level and mode of cooperation (Pruitt, 1967; Selten and
Berg, 1970). Dierently labeled decision tasks (e.g., game title, players' actions, player types,
etc.) can also lead to divergent and non-consistent behavior (c.f., Tversky and Kahneman,
1981; Elliott, Hayward, and Canon, 1998; Burnham, McCabe, and Smith, 2000; Liberman,
Samuels, and Ross, 2004). Moreover, further contributions have revealed that subjects' be-
havior can be inuenced by the presentation of the same essential information as positive or
negative. This type of framing is commonly known as valence framing. In this broad domain,
studies dealing with public goods games creating either positive externalities (public good)
or negative externalities (public bad) are well established (c.f. Fleishman, 1988; Andreoni,
1995; Sonnemans, Schram, and Oerman, 1998; Willinger and Ziegelmeyer, 1999; Cookson,
2000; and Park, 2000; Dufwenberg, G achter, and Hennig-Schmidt, 2008).2 Results from these
publications in general suggest that experimental designs enabling positive externalities are
aligned with signicantly higher cooperation levels compared to setups allowing for negative
externalities.3
This paper intends to analyze subject-pool aliation as one factor leading to dierent und
conicting levels of cooperation dependent on game presentation forms with either positive or
negative externalities. As shown by several authors choosing subjects from dierent countries
promises substantial cross-societal variation (see, e.g., Roth, Prasnikar, Okuno-Fujiwara, and
Zamir, 1991; Oosterbeek, Sloof, and van de Kuilen (2004), Herrmann, Th oni, and G achter,
2008). To maximize chances of observing behavioral dierences across subject-pools, we con-
ducted an experimental study in dierent subject pools - Abu-Dis (West Bank), Chengdu
(China), Helsinki (Finland), and Jerusalem (Israel) - holding the type of subject pool (uni-
2See also Levin, Schneider, and Gaeth (1998) and Abbink and Hennig-Schmidt (2006) for comprehensive
reviews on framing literature and framing types.
3Brewer and Kramer (1986), McCusker and Carnevale (1995), and Sell, Chen, Hunter-Holmes, and Johans-
son (2002) found an eect that went into the opposite direction. In a British subject-pool Cubitt, Drouvelis,
and G achter (2008) do not nd a signicant dierence in contributions across game frames; neither do Dufwen-
berg et al. (2008) in their neutral label game.
1versity students) constant. The societies of our subject-pools dier according to widely used
criteria developed by social scientists and, partly, in geographical distance.4 In addition to
these classications, the historical and political background of Israelis and Palestinians5 - who
live next to each other - makes them a promising testbed for investigating the link between
subject-pool aliation and cooperative behavior.
Since cooperation in situations with positive or negative externality is crucial for human
interaction from an individual perspective as well as from a societal point of view, we will
also separately compare behavior under both conditions across subject-pools to evaluate the
validity of ndings. We will further show that our experimental approach and the awareness
of the impact of subject-pool dierences on frame perception have important implications.
Formally identical bargaining setups might be perceived dierently, evoke deviant beliefs in
dierent subject-pools, and lead to divergent behavior.
Cross-societal studies conducted so far typically apply experimental designs with one form
of presentation. Possible, unintentionally induced presentation eects - although not the focus
- are not considered (e.g., Anderson, Rodgers and Rodriguez, 2000; Henrich, Boyd, Bowles,
Camerer, Fehr, Gintis, and McElreath, 2001; Buchan, Croson, and Johnson, 2004).6 To the
best of our knowledge there exist only two studies taking a cross-societal perspective of fram-
ing eects into account. The rst work, a questionnaire study by Levin, Gaeth, Evangelista,
Albaum, and Schreiber (2001), involves Americans and Australians. Therein, American sub-
jects claimed to reduce a signicantly higher amount of red meat consumption if the negative
consequences of not reducing (i.e., a higher risk of developing cancer) were stressed compared
to a treatment in which the positive consequences of reducing were emphasized. On the con-
trary, Australian subjects did not respond dierently to the two frames. In a second study,
4As Inglehart, Basa~ nez, and Moreno (2001) point out, dierent behavioral standards and norms are par-
ticularly likely if countries vary in their religious heritage. Our subject pools are located in countries that
bear dierent religious heritages: Islam in Palestine; Buddhism, Taoism, and Confucianism (although not a
religion in a narrower sense) in China; Christianity in Finnland; and Judaism in Israel. Moreover, contrary
to geographically distant Chinese and Palestinians who are collectivistic and high-context societies (i.e., they
use high-context messages in routine communication, in which words and word choices are very important.
Few words can communicate a complex message very eectively to an in-group), Finns and Israelis - who are
also located far from each other - live in more individualistic and low-context societies (i.e, the communicator
needs to be more explicit and the value of a single word is less important) (Hall, 1976; Hofstede, 2001).
5At the moment, a Palestinian state does not exist. Most of our subjects are formally citizens of the states
of Israel and Jordan. Nevertheless, we will refer to them as Palestinians to ease the notation.
6See, for a specic international overview of public goods and commons dilemma studies, Cardenas and
Carpenter (2004).
2Sell et al. (2002) investigated the consistency and direction of framing eects across dierent
countries. They found very similar patterns of cooperation both in the United States and in
China. In both subject-pools, group members were more cooperative when facing resource
goods dilemmas compared to a situation where they were confronted with a standard public
goods game. We will extend the approach of Levin et al. (2001) and Sell et al. (2002) with
regard to a more extensive cross-subject-pool analysis and a discussion of the behavioral and
- more importantly - methodological consequences of our ndings.7
For our study, we conducted two series of experiments applying two frames of a simple
two-person continuous prisoner's dilemma game which represent dierent presentations of
the same - strategically equivalent - decision task. That is, in both cases individuals must
choose between a maximization of their own prot or to cooperate at some personal cost to
increase the joint payo. Individuals can give up an immediate benet to sustain a resource
for the other player's use. Thus, in one treatment, action creates a positive externality for
the matched player. On the contrary, in our second treatment, action results in a negative
externality. Like a public goods dilemma, our rst treatment is a problem of contribution.
Only with positive contributions is an increase in eciency achieved. Similarly, our second
treatment, like a commons dilemma, is a problem of consumption. The lower the share of per-
sonal consumption, the higher is the eciency. Any consequentialist theory, such as expected
utility theory, suggests that these two types of presentations are equivalent because the un-
derlying game-structures are strategically equivalent and have the same payo consequences.
However, giving and taking are psychologically dierent actions and ndings from one set
of studies may not be generalized to the other set; generally between dierent subject-pools
and especially in a cross-societal environment (Brewer and Kramer, 1986; Fleishman, 1988).
This fact makes our experimental framework an appropriate tool to study presentation eects
across subject-pools.
Our West Bank and Chinese data show that game presentation can signicantly inuence
decision makers' actions and associated rst-order beliefs. In the positive externality con-
7Since we have not conducted more than one experiment per society we implicitly rely on the assumption
that there are no dierences within societies and that the only dierence is between subject-pools. Yet, some
experimental evidence supports this assumption: G achter and Herrmann (2009) and Herrmann and Th oni
(2009) conducted experimental studies in more than one subject pool in Switzerland and Russia and found no
dierences within societies but only between them. Future research should address this methodological point
on a broader international scale.
3dition, substantially more cooperation is manifested in both subject-pools compared to the
situation with negative externality. In contrast, the experiments conducted in Helsinki and
Jerusalem yielded dierent results. There, on an aggregate level, no signicant presentation
eect could be detected. In all subject-pools, neither the Nash equilibrium nor the social
optimum is reached.
Comparing the level of cooperation under each of our two conditions across subject-
pools yields opposite conclusions about cooperative behavior in the dierent subject-pools.
While subjects in Abu-Dis and Chengdu are more cooperative in the treatment with positive
externality, behavior in the treatment with negative externality is more cooperative in Helsinki
and Jerusalem.
Our results shed new light on the impact of presentation conditioned by preferences and
social norms in dierent subject-pools embedded in dierent societies. Framing eects are
not robust. Therefore, we will argue that for deriving a conclusion about a subject-pool's (co-
operative) behavior, dierent presentations of logically identical experimental setups should
be considered and evaluated adequately. We believe that this is of particular importance
when discussing cross-cultural evidence.
2 Experimental framework: A two-person cooperation game
The two applied game frames both represent a straightforward two-person continuous pris-
oner's dilemma game in which subjects can choose an individual level of cooperation from a
given range of possible actions.8 Thus, in contrast to the classical prisoner's dilemma game,
the question whether to cooperate or to defect is not a binary choice. In the rst game-frame
(PDP), a player's decision creates a positive externality to the matched player's payo, while
in the second game-frame (PDN), it induces a negative externality. In the next subsection,
we will describe both the PDP-frame and the PDN-frame in detail.
2.1 Game-frame with positive externality (PDP)
At the beginning, two randomly matched players i and j obtain an integer initial endowment
X = Xi = Xj. Each player then has the opportunity to transfer an integer part a of X,
8Please refer to Appendix A for further details on the prisoner's dilemma game and public goods game
nature of the game.
4nothing, or the entire amount X to the opposite player. Both players choose a 2 f0;:::;Xg
simultaneously. Each amount a, which is transferred to the paired player, will be multiplied
by factor k > 1 yielding an eciency gain by transferring a positive amount a. Players'
payos consist of the initial endowment X minus the transferred amount a plus the obtained
and k-multiplied amount a transferred by the opposite player. Formally, player i's payo
function is given by:
PDP
i = Xi   aPDP
i + k  aPDP
j , with aPDP
i ;aPDP
j 2 f0;1;:::;Xg, and k > 1
The payo of the opposite player j is calculated analogously. The only Nash equilibrium is
a
i = a
j = 0. Player i anticipates player j's choice aPDP
j = 0 and will therefore also choose
aPDP
i = 0. The collective optimal choice is ^ ai = ^ aj = X since it maximizes the joint payo
PDP = i + j.
2.2 Game-frame with negative externality (PDN)
The design of the PDN-frame is equivalent to the rst version of the game, but instead
of choosing an amount a which is transferred to the opposite player, decision makers must
choose an integer which is transferred from the other player. Again two players i and j
interact simultaneously. Initially, both receive an endowment X = Xi = Xj. Each player
then has the opportunity to transfer an integer part a, nothing, or the entire amount X from
the matched player. Thus, again, both players simultaneously choose a 2 f0;:::;Xg. The
dierence X  a, which is respectively not transferred, will be multiplied with k > 1. Hence,
by transferring low amounts or nothing, eciency increases. In contrast to the PDP-frame,
the amount a, which is transferred, is not multiplied. Players' payos are determined by the
multiplied dierence of their initial endowments X and the amount a taken by the opposite
player, and the amount a which players take away from the counterpart. Formally, player i0s
payo function is given by:
PDN
i = (Xi   aPDN
j )  k + aPDN
i , with aPDN
i ;aPDN
j 2 f0;1;:::;Xg, and k > 1
Player j's payo is calculated analogously. The only Nash equilibrium is a
i = Xj and
a
j = Xi. Player i anticipates player j's choice aPDN
j = Xi and will therefore also choose
aPDN
i = Xj. The optimal collective choice is ^ ai = ^ aj = 0 since it maximizes the joint payo
PDN = i + j.
52.3 Equivalence of the two game-frames
In both versions of the game, player i's payo i consists of two parts - a self-determined
component iA and a part iB resulting from player j's actions. Therefore, the total payo
of player i can be stated as: i = iA + iB. Player i's self-determined payo fraction in
the PDP-frame is the amount XPDP
i   aPDP
i which is not given to the other player. In the
PDN-frame, it is the amount aPDN
i that is taken away from the other player.
The amount aPDP
j  k is the amount which player i receives from the other player in the
PDP-frame. In the PDN-frame, the amount determined by the other player is the payo
fraction (XPDN
i   aPDN
j )  k that the other player leaves to player i.
This illustrates that there are one-to-one mappings fi and fj of player i's or j's strategies
ai and aj, respectively, in the PDP-frame onto the strategy spaces for i and j in the PDN-
frame such that ai;aj and (fi(ai);fj(aj)) yield the same payos in the PDP-frame and the
PDN-frame, respectively.
3 Experimental procedures
The experiments were conducted between May 2006 and February 2007. The sessions in
Abu-Dis were run at the Al-Quds University located in the West Bank, close to the city of
Jerusalem. We collected the Chinese data at the Sichuan University in Chengdu. Finnish data
were gathered at the University of Helsinki and observations for Jerusalem were obtained at
the RatioLab of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. In all universities students from dierent
departments participated.9
In Abu-Dis and Jerusalem, each student received a xed payment of 25 NIS upon showing
up for the experiment. In Chengdu [Helsinki], each subject was paid 20 YUAN [4 EURO]. At
each university both versions of the game were played as one-shot games, applying the paper
and pencil method. We have chosen one-shot games to avoid confounding framing eects
with strategical issues and to elicit behavior that is only conditioned to subjects' experiences
9In Chengdu, Helsinki, and Jerusalem, only subjects with very limited experimental experience were re-
cruited (excluding previous collaborations in trust game, prisoner's dilemma, gift exchange, or public goods
game experiments) for participation. Palestinian subjects had no experimental experience. The median age
in Abu-Dis [Chengdu, Helsinki, Jerusalem] was 22 [23,24,25], and 55% [48%,69%,40%] females participated,
respectively. We checked for possible eects of age and gender. We could not nd any signicant inuences,
neither for each subject-pool separately nor for the complete sample of observations.
6Table 1
Overview over Treatments, Locations and Observations
Session Treatment Location # subjects
1 PDP Abu-Dis 20
2 PDN Abu-Dis 20
3 PDP Jerusalem 20
4 PDN Jerusalem 20
5 PDP Chengdu 20
6 PDN Chengdu 20
7 PDP Helsinki 21
8 PDN Helsinki 21
Sum 142
and perceptions within their specic reference groups. Table 1 displays sessions, treatment
conditions, and locations.
Experiments were run by local helpers who were comprehensively instructed and sup-
ported by the authors, who in turn, were present but stayed in the background. The mo-
tivation for this procedure was to minimise potential experimenter demand eects which
arguably would be much higher if one of the authors would have run the experiment because
of the cultural attribution - foreigners might be perceived dierently across locations - that
subjects might have made in this case. In addition, if a local runs the experiments there are
no language issues and culture is not primed.10
Instructions were written in neutral language, strictly avoiding terms like `give', `take', or
`cooperation'. In fact, we neither labeled nor put disposable strategies into positive or negative
light which should enhance the validity of our ndings. They diered between treatments only
by the direction of the conducted transfer. Accordingly, transfers were to be realized either
to player j or from player j. This procedure ensured that only the technical presentation
and not the wording or further frames could inuence subjects' behavior. Dependent on the
location, the instructions were either given in Arabic, Chinese, Finnish, or Hebrew.11
Subjects were endowed with X = 10 Talers in the opening of every game.12 The multiplier
10This procedure was also implemented by Herrmann et al. (2008).
11To avoid translation errors regarding the task and the procedure, instructions were translated by native
speakers from German into the corresponding language and afterwards back-translated into German by a
dierent person (Brislin, 1970). For instructions, see Appendix B.
12Taler = experimental currency. During the experiment all transfers were made in Taler. The exchange
rate from Taler to NIS [YUAN, EURO] was 1 Taler = 2.5 NIS [1.5 YUAN, 0.5 EURO]. We adjusted expected
7k was xed with k = 2. The individual payo in the Nash equilibrium was 10 Talers for each
player. The Pareto optimum outcome generated 20 Talers, respectively. In the run of the
experiment, participants received no feedback on matched player's decisions.
After running the experiment, two questionnaires were handed out. In the rst ques-
tionnaire, we asked participants for their rst-order beliefs on the behavior of the matched
player.13 Correct beliefs were rewarded with an additional Taler. The second questionnaire
covered socio-demographic questions. At the end of the session, the outcome for each partic-
ipant was calculated, converted into the local currency, and paid out.
4 Results
The basis of our analysis is the level of cooperation exhibited by the participants in both
treatment conditions. In the PDP-frame, it is the transferred amount to the other player
(aPDP), and in the PDN-frame, it is the amount left to the other player (10   aPDN). We
will rst compare treatment-dependent cooperation levels and associated rst-order beliefs
across subject-pools and check for consistency among treatments. In a second step, we will
rst investigate potential framing eects within our subject-pools and then contrast actual
framing eect magnitudes across subject-pools.
4.1 Treatment-dependent cooperation across subject-pools
In PDP, the highest average cooperation level is observed in Abu-Dis (7:10), followed by
Chengdu (5:50), Jerusalem (4:40), and Helsinki (3:67). Nearly the same sequence holds for
rst-order beliefs on cooperation: highest contributions are expected in Abu-Dis (6:05), fol-
lowed by Chengdu (4:55), Helsinki (3:57), and Jerusalem (3:40). A Kruskal-Wallis test shows
that cooperation levels and associated rst-order beliefs dier signicantly across subject-
pools in PDP (p = :004, p = :027; both two-sided).14 Hence, when we exclusively look at
the positive externality frame, which is commonly done in subject-pool comparisons, we nd
hourly payos to the average wage per hour of a local student helper.
13We are aware of the fact that stated beliefs can be biased by prior decisions that have already been
undertaken. However, since actual unbiased decisions are more valuable for our analysis, we applied this
procedure.
14Pair-wise analyses reveal that contributions in Abu-Dis are economically and statistically higher than in
Jerusalem and Helsinki (p = :000, p = :005). Moreover, subjects in Chengdu are more cooperative than in
Helsinki (p = :084) (all Mann-Whitney-U test, two-sided).
8clear varieties (see Table 2 and Figure 1). This leads us to our rst result:
Result 1: In the positive externalities treatment (PDP), cooperation levels dier signicantly
across subject-pools. The same holds for associated rst-order beliefs.
Next, we investigate average cooperation levels in PDN across subject-pools. In PDN, the
highest cooperation is found in Helsinki (4:67), followed by Jerusalem (4:55), and Chengdu
(2:65) and Abu-Dis (2:65). We receive almost the same order when analyzing associated
rst-order beliefs: highest contributions are expected in Helsinki (3:67), followed by Jerusalem
(3:40), Chengdu (3:20), and Abu-Dis (2:75) (see Table 2 and Figure 1). A Kruskal-Wallis test
reveals that cooperation levels signicantly dier across subject-pools in PDN (p = :053, two-
sided).15 However, this does not hold for associated rst-order beliefs (p = :900, two-sided).16
Hence, we conclude:
Result 2: In the negative externalities treatment (PDN), cooperation levels signicantly
dier across subject-pools. Associated rst-order beliefs are not statistically dierent across
subject-pools.
4.2 The impact of framing in dierent subject-pools
We now explore whether there are dierences in the impact of dierent game frames on co-
operation levels and associated rst-order beliefs across subject-pools to explain our previous
ndings.
In Abu-Dis [Chengdu], on average 7:10 [5:50] Talers were transferred to the opposite
player in PDP. In the contrary, in PDN, only 2:65 [2:65] Talers were left to the opponent.
The observed mean dierences between the two treatments are highly signicant in both
locations (p = :000 [p = :009], both Mann-Whitney-U test, two-sided). A look at the medians
yields a similar result (see Figure 1). When looking at rst-order beliefs we nd a comparable
pattern: in both locations, subjects on average expected higher cooperation in PDP (6:05
[4:55]) compared to PDN (2:75 [3:20]). In Abu-Dis, the dierence in beliefs is highly signicant
(p = :000) whereas in Chengdu, average beliefs do not signicantly dier (p = :321; all Mann-
Whitney-U test, two-sided).
15Pairwise analyses show that cooperation in Helsinki is signicantly higher than in Chengdu and Abu-Dis
(p = :059 and p = :032). The same holds for Jerusalem; here cooperation is also signicantly higher compared
to Chengdu and Abu-Dis (p = :045 and p = :077) (all Mann-Whitney-U test, two-sided).
16In all subject pools actions and associated beliefs are positively correlated, refer to Table 2.
9Table 2
Average cooperation levels, associated rst-order beliefs and correlation between beliefs and
cooperation level per location
Abu-Dis Chengdu Helsinki Jerusalem
Cooperation levels
PDP 7.10 (2.36) 5.50 (3.69) 3.67 (2.63) 4.40 (2.95)
PDN 2.65 (2.08) 2.65 (2.76) 4.67 (3.26) 4.55 (3.38)
MWU p < :01 p < :01 p = :41 p = :95
First-order beliefs
PDP 6.05 (2.89) 4.55 (3.90) 3.57 (2.79) 3.40 (2.50)
PDN 2.75 (2.34) 3.20 (3.21) 3.67 (3.38) 3.40 (3.14)
MWU p < :01 p = :32 p = :88 p = :97
Correlation First-order belief/Cooperation level
Spearman  = :64  = :68  = :58  = :41
Signicance p < :01 p < :01 p < :01 p < :01
Numbers in paratheses denote standard deviations.
MWU: two-sided Mann-Whitney-U-test for the comparison between PDP and PDN.
Figure 1
Median levels of cooperation and associated rst-order beliefs per treatment and subject-pool.










































10In Helsinki and Jerusalem, we observe a dierent picture. In Helsinki [Jerusalem], the
shown average level of cooperation is slightly higher under PDN than in PDP. In PDP on
average 3:67 [4:40] Talers were transferred to the other player compared to 4:67 [4:55] which
were left in PDN. However, these dierences are not statistically signicant (p = :407 [p =
:952]. The same nding holds for rst-order beliefs: in Helsinki [Jerusalem], subjects on
average expected similar cooperation in PDP (3:57 [3:40]), as compared to PDN (3:67 [3:40]).
In both places, beliefs do not dier signicantly (p = :875 [p = :973], all Mann-Whitney-U
test, two-sided).
Our ndings on the prevalence of framing eects illustrate that framing eects in coop-
erative behavior are not robust; in Abu-Dis and Chengdu, they are detectable, whereas in
Helsinki and Jerusalem, no evidence for a presentation bias is found (cf. Table 2 and Figure
1). In addition, mean dierences between PDP and PDN also dier across subject-pools.
In order to quantify, these dierences we now compare the exact magnitude of the detected
framing eects in pairs between subject-pools - this is the dierence in cooperation levels
among PDP and PDN per location - by comparing the dierences in dierences between two
locations and applying a statistical test to them. For this analysis we use a Monte-Carlo ap-
proximation of a two-sided permutation test with 100;000 draws.17 Our analysis shows that
the eect magnitude in Abu-Dis [Chengdu] is signicantly higher than in Helsinki (p = :000
[p = :007]) and in Jerusalem (p = :000 [p = :004]). No dierences in eect magnitudes can be
found among Abu-Dis and Chengdu nor for a comparison between Helsinki and Jerusalem
(p = :222 and p = :539).
Taking our evidence on the impact of framing across subject-pools yields our third result:
Result 3: In Abu-Dis and Chengdu, subjects are signicantly more sensitive to the game-
frame than subjects from Helsinki and Jerusalem. In both subject-pools, cooperation is sig-
nicantly higher under the PDP-condition than in the PDN-treatment. On the contrary, no
evidence for a presentation eect in Helsinki and Jerusalem is observed.
Our results demonstrate that observed levels of cooperation found in one subject-pool
17We apply a test, which computes the probability for obtaining a sample with the same or a larger dierence
between the two eect magnitudes by randomly assigning each single action in PDP and PDN to one of the
two locations, while at the same time keeping the condition constant. The resulting fraction of trials with
larger or same dierences functions as the p-value. This procedure is analogous to the one applied by Abbink
and Rockenbach (2006). Cohen's d could also be applied as a measure for the eect size per location. However,
this yields only aggregate measures, which are not testable (Cohen's d: Abu-Dis d = 1:99; Chengdu d = 0:875;
Helsinki d = 0:337 ; Jerusalem d = 0:047).
11broadly depend on the game presentation form. In addition and strikingly, the ordering of
cooperation levels across subject-pools is almost reversed in the two treatment conditions: in
PDP, we observe the highest level of cooperation in Abu-Dis and the lowest in Helsinki. On
the contrary, in PDN we nd most cooperation in Helsinki and least in Abu-Dis (together with
Chengdu). This detected swapping of order, nicely captured by Figure 1, shows how sensitive
cross-subject-pool comparisons can potentially be toward game frames - results derived from
comparisons under one game frame do not necessarily hold for other frames of the same
decision task.18 Consequently, we conclude the results section with our last result:
Result 4: The elicitation, occurrence, and comparison of cooperative behavior across dierent
subject-pools substantially depends on the chosen game presentation. Therefore results may
vary across game frames and subject-pools.
5 Summary and Discussion
The aim of this paper was to investigate the impact of framing on cooperative behavior
dependent on subject-pool aliation. Investigating two logically and strategically identical
decision problems in an international setting we demonstrated that data obtained from only
one presentation form might lead to only partly valid results and conclusions on subject-pool-
specic behavior. This nding holds especially if results are compared and evaluated across
subject-pools. Our results conrm and extend the work by Levin et al. (2001) and Sell et al.
(2002).
Our results from Abu-Dis and Chengdu have shown that the formal presentation of a
decision problem can inuence subjects' actions substantially. The observed cooperation level
is signicantly higher when subjects create positive externalities toward each other compared
to a situation in which resulting externalities are negative. In the positive condition, subjects
from Abu-Dis and Chengdu are more willing to transfer higher amounts and thus voluntarily
increase mutual welfare. On the contrary, in the negative condition, subjects leave relatively
less to the counterpart.
Experiments run in Helsinki and Jerusalem yielded dierent results. There, aggregated
18One interesting detail, however, is, that average observed cooperation levels (i.e., the average cooperation
levels over both presentations) do not dier signicantly between locations. Average cooperation levels [rst-
order beliefs] over both presentation forms are: Abu-Dis 4.88 [4.40], Chengdu 4.08 [3.88], Helsinki 4.17 [3,62]
and Jerusalem 4.48 [3.40].
12subjects' actions appear to be externally unaected across treatments in terms of the mea-
sured average outcome. No signicant presentation eect could be veried. Finns and Israelis
seem to show a similar behavioral pattern in both treatments. This nding is consistent with
ndings from Cubitt et al. (2008) and Dufwenberg et al. (2008) who conducted experiments
with German and British subjects, respectively.
Our ndings in Abu-Dis and Chengdu are in line with prior work on presentation eects in
public goods games (e.g., Andreoni, 1995; Sonnemans et al., 1998; Willinger and Ziegelmeyer,
1999; and Park, 2000) and with studies on goal framing (e.g., Meyerowitz and Chaiken, 1987;
Levin, Schneider and Gaeth, 1998). In these experiments, the negative formulation of an
identical problem leeds to less cooperative behavior compared to a positive one.
The observed behavior could be connected to the concept of loss aversion and the so-called
endowment eect, as introduced by Tversky and Kahneman (1981). To explain evident higher
cooperation in take-dilemmas McCusker and Carnevale (1995) argue that give dilemmas
involve decisions about current losses and take dilemmas about gains. Since people are
motivated to avoid a loss more than they are motivated to obtain an equivalent gain they
contribute more in the take game. Contrary to this link it is possible that our Palestinian
and Chinese subjects perceive an amount taken away from them as a substantial loss, while
they perceive an amount voluntarily given away as less of a loss or no loss. In other words,
they are more sensitive to a loss induced by a second person, compared to a loss induced
by themselves. As a consequence of this cognition, they might react much more sensitively
to the threat of a possible loss induced by the right of the second player to take away any
amount, as compared to the situation where they can determine themselves which amount to
give away. To avoid this expected loss induced by the matched player, players take more from
the matched player and, thus, cooperation is on a lower level in the PDN-frame as compared
to the PDP-frame. This might deliver an explanation why, in this study, Palestinians and
Chinese seem to obtain a higher benet from doing a good deed rather than from not doing
a bad deed.19
An alternative explanation for the observed behavior in Abu-Dis and Chengdu refers to
the action itself. In the PDP-frame, action leads to cooperation, whereas under the PDN-
19Andreoni (1995) argues that utility of people increases if they perceive the act of transferring as doing
something good (\warm-glow") and decreases when they perceive it as doing something bad (\cold-prickle").
13condition, the opposite holds. There, action results in competitive and less ecient behavior.
The dierence in the sensitivity toward the given frame might stem from a dierent attitude
toward action depending on power to control, i.e. to decide how much to transfer. Galinsky,
Gruenfeld, and Magee (2003) have shown that priming high power leads to increased action in
a social dilemma regardless of whether that action had pro-social or anti-social consequences.
Being primed with power incites participants both to give more to and take more from
a commonly shared resource. The dierent perception of own power of Palestinians and
Chinese - performing notably more action both in the PDP- and in the PDN-frame (14.45
[12.85] Talers are transferred in sum in both treatments) - and Finns and Israelis - showing
a lower degree of action in both conditions (transferring 9.00 [9.85] Talers) - may deliver an
approach to explain behavioral dierences across subject-pools and potentially even cultures.
Future research should address this issue by linking dierent concepts of self image (e.g.,
power perception, self esteem) and situational power to control to decisions.
Behavior in Jerusalem and Helsinki might be rooted in the fact that our subjects live
in Western, more individualistic, and low-context societies. In such societies, ties between
individuals are loose, people are expected to look out for themselves, and behavior and beliefs
are spelled out explicitly with single words being perceived as less content-loaded (Hall,
1976; Hofstede, 2001). A series of studies has illustrated that individualists often behave
more competitively and outcome-oriented in cooperation settings, compared to people from
collectivistic and high-context subject-pools (e.g., Hemesath and Pomponio, 1998; Carpenter,
Daniere, and Takahashi, 2004; Buchan, Johnson, and Croson, 2006; Chuah, Homann, Jones,
and Williams, 2007; Hennig-Schmidt, Li, and Yang, 2008). This nding is conrmed by our
data if we only consider behavior under the positive externality condition which represents the
commonly applied game frame in subject-pools located in dierent cultures. Further studies
must address the cause for the similarity of behavior displayed under dierent presentation
conditions: Do Israelis and Finns actually perceive the two games as presentation forms of the
same decision problem, or do they apply dierent approaches leading to similar behavioral
consequences and outcome?
One interesting question in this context is whether the framing of the game also aects
beliefs and how beliefs may, in turn, condition subjects' outcomes as previously demonstrated
by Dufwenberg et al. (2008), and Fischbacher and G achter (2010). Hence, if dierent frames
14aect beliefs of dierent subject-pools dierently and if beliefs guide behavior we might also
nd subject-pool dierences in framing eects. Large subject-pool dierences which generate
well pronounced discrepancies in belief structures might therefore also enhance dierences in
actual behavior. As we have demonstrated, our ndings on subjects' cooperative actions are
largely reected in subjects' rst-order beliefs. In addition, as Table 2 in the results section
indicates, actions and beliefs are signicantly positively correlated. In fact, we can assume
that in our cross-cultural setting behavior is to some extent guided by underlying rst-order
beliefs. Future studies should explicitly pick up the following issues: rstly, whether subjects'
contributions are guided by existing belief structures in broader cross-cultural settings and,
secondly, how dierences in this conditional cooperation can be explained by variables typical
to those societies included.
The ndings of our study might confront cross-societal research with new challenges: com-
paring levels of cooperation under each of the conditions across subject-pools might lead to
opposing conclusions about society-specic behavioral attitudes and their underlying motives.
Our Palestinian and Chinese subjects display a relatively higher cooperation level and more
positive beliefs on opponent players' contributions than involved Finns and Israelis when only
the positive externalities condition is considered. On the contrary, Finnish and Israeli sub-
jects cooperate relatively more and state substantially higher beliefs when only the negative
externalities condition is regarded. These striking ndings would not have been detected by
the implementation of a mere positive framing of the cooperation task. Taking results from
dierent presentations into account might not only enrich socio-economic theory, but also
rene our experimental methodology.
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19Appendix
A External analogy with classical PD- and PG-games
To show external analogy of both versions of our cooperation game with a classical binary-
choice PD, we write down the 2  2-payo matrix form of both designs including only the
extreme points of total (e.g., aPDP
i = 10;aPDN





2  2-matrix, representing the prisoner's dilemma game.
1;2 C2 D2
C1 k  X;k  X 0;X + k  X
D1 X + k  X;0 X;X
The PD-condition (1 + k)  X > k  X > X > 0 is satised for all k > 1 in both game-
frames. In our experiment, this condition is fullled, with k = 2. Given these parameters,
by linear interpolation, payos from the discrete payo matrix can be obtained. Having a
freely pre-determined range of possible actions a allows to obtain a non-binary measure of
cooperation.
We now show external analogy of both game-frames with a typical PG-design. The payo
function of a common 2-person PG is given by:
PG
i = Xi   ai + k 
ai + aj
2
, with i 6= j, and k > 1
Xi represents player i's initial endowment. The parameter ai is the investment into the public
good. Accordingly, Xi   ai represents the investment into the private good. All investments
made to the public good are multiplied by the factor k. The fraction of one half of the
increased public pie is returned to both players i and j by the addition to their investments
into the private good. For k < 1, it is rational for both players to invest nothing into the
public good since the public pie shrinks. In the case of k > 1, both players can increase
their personal income by investing into the public good. However, in this case each player
has a strong incentive to free-ride, hoping to reach even higher returns caused by a positive
20investment of the second player.
From the initial PG-equation, we get:
i = Xi   (1  
k
2
)  ai + k 
aj
2
() i = Xi     ai + k    aj, with  = 1  
k
2
, and k =
k
2  (1   k
2)
The payo-function of the PDP-frame was given in equation by:
PDP
i = Xi   aPDP
i + k  aPDP
j
It is evident that both game-frames are of the same type: a PG-game with parameter k is
formally similar to the PDP-frame with parameter k. Because of internal equivalence among
PDP and PDN it is obvious that the PDN-frame is a PG, too. Contrary to the PG-game,
in PDP and PDN there is no backow of own investments. Thus, each ai > 0 is transferred
directly to the opposite player, thereby providing a lower individual incentive to cooperate.
21B Instructions for the experiment (for PDP and PDN)
B.1 Introduction
Thank you for taking part in this experiment. Please read these instructions very carefully.
It is very important that you do not talk to other participants for the time of the entire
experiment. In case you do not understand some parts of the experiment, please read through
these instructions again. If you have further questions after this, please give us a sign by
raising your hand out of your cubicle. We will then approach you in order to answer your
questions personally.
To guarantee your anonymity you will draw a personal code before the experiment starts.
Please write this code on top of every sheet you use during this experiment. You will later
receive your payment from this experiment by showing your personal code. This method
ensures that we are not able to link your answers and decisions to you personally.
During this experiment you can earn money. The currency within the experiment is `Taler'.
The exchange rate from Taler to CURRENCY is:
1 Taler = XX CURRENCY
Your personal income from the experiment depends on both your own decisions and on the
decisions of other participants. Your personal income will be paid to you in cash as soon as
the experiment is over.
During the course of the experiment, you will interact with a randomly assigned other par-
ticipant. The assigned participant makes his/her decisions at the same point in time as you
do. You will get no information on who this person actually is, neither during the experi-
ment, nor at some point after the experiment. Similarly, the other participant will not be
given any information about your identity. You will receive information about the assigned
participant's decision after the entire experiment has ended.
After the experiment, please complete a short questionnaire, which we need for the statistical
analysis of the experimental data.
22B.2 Description of the experiment (PDP)
In this experiment, you are randomly matched with another participant. You act as Person
A, and the randomly assigned other participant acts as Person B. You and Person B must
simultaneously make a similarly structured decision.
Person A and Person B rst receive an initial endowment of 10 Talers.
You now have the opportunity to transfer any part of your endowment to Person B. You can
only transfer integer amounts - thus, you can only choose amounts aA 2 [0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5,
6, 7, 8, 9, 10].
The amount you transfer to Person B is doubled. That means that Person B receives twice
the amount you have transferred to him/her.
The randomly assigned participant acting as Person B is given exactly the same alternatives
as you have. He/she also has the possibility to transfer any amount to you. The amount
Person B transfers to you is also doubled. That means that you receive twice the amount
Person B has transferred to you.
You will make your decisions simultaneously. During the course of the experiment, neither
person receives any information concerning the decision of the other person.
How the income is calculated
Your personal income can be calculated as follows:
Initial endowment
- amount you choose to transfer to Person B
+ twice the amount b Person B transferred to you
= your personal income
23B.3 Description of the experiment (PDN)
In this experiment you are randomly matched with another participant. You act as Person
A, and the randomly assigned other participant acts as Person B. You and Person B must
simultaneously make a similarly structured decision.
Person A and Person B rst receive an initial endowment of 10 Talers.
You now have the opportunity to transfer any part of Person B's endowment to yourself. You
can only transfer integer amounts - thus, you can only choose amounts aA 2 [0, 1, 2, 3, 4,
5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10].
The remaining amount - that is the amount that you do not transfer from Person B's endow-
ment to yourself - is doubled. This means that Person B receives twice the amount that
you do not transfer from him/her.
The randomly assigned participant acting as person B is given exactly the same alternatives
as you have. He/she also has the possibility to transfer any amount to himself/herself. The
remaining amount that he/she does not transfer from your endowment to himself/herself is
doubled. This means that you receive twice the amount that he/she does not transfer
from you.
You will make your decisions simultaneously. During the course of the experiment, neither
person receives any information concerning the decision of the other person.
How the income is calculated
Your personal income can be calculated as follows:
+ amount you choose to transfer from Person B to yourself
+ twice the amount Person B did not transfer from your endowment
to himself/herself
= your personal income
24